Tag Archives: Latker

Patent agreements in Federal Procurement Regulations and Bayh-Dole, 2

Posted on October 18, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

If we return for a moment to O’Connor’s article–it is a great read for what it aims to do, but for O’Connor’s theme of abstract mistaken assumptions rather than providing a specific account of Latker’s lack of drafting ability–there is … Continue reading →

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Exceptional Circumstances in Bayh-Dole, 5

Posted on August 23, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

Despite the recognition that there are all sorts of federal research programs primarily directed at nonprofit-hosted research that would benefit from a determination that Bayh-Dole’s default provisions do not do a good job of promoting Bayh-Dole’s stated policy and objectives, … Continue reading →

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The mistaken assumptions of Bayh-Dole, 2

Posted on May 11, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

We are working with an article by Sean O’Connor to get at an underlying problem with discussion of Bayh-Dole. O’Connor, a law professor, appears to be working diligently to find a way to “fix” Bayh-Dole so that universities end up … Continue reading →

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The mistaken assumptions of Bayh-Dole, 1

Posted on May 10, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

I know this article by Sean O’Connor on the mistaken assumption in Bayh-Dole is six years old and I have discussed this issue previously, but since it is out there on the web, and as far as I know it hasn’t … Continue reading →

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Bayh-Dole, federal welfare for patent bureaucrats

Posted on November 7, 2016 by Gerald Barnett

There is a vast public literature–academic, legal, and popular–that claims Bayh-Dole is a wild success. That literature claims that compliance with Bayh-Dole requires commercialization, and that it is by commercialization that public benefit from federal research comes about. That argument reduces … Continue reading →

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Behind the Usual Narrative, Part V

Posted on October 24, 2016 by Gerald Barnett

Universities Help to Make the Problem Universities created the federal contracting mess for basic research by insisting that the federal government not concentrate contracting authority in a single agency set up specifically for providing grants under the most liberal patent … Continue reading →

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Does Bayh-Dole Require Reasonable Pricing?

Posted on October 2, 2016 by Gerald Barnett

[Revised and extended for clarity] Short answer: no, but well, sort of, er, actually–yes! but not what you might expect. In 2005, Norman J. Latker, the key draftsman of both the Institutional Patent Agreement and Bayh-Dole published a critique, along with … Continue reading →

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