Tag Archives: Latker

The IPA and Bayh-Dole on nonprofit assignment of subject inventions, 3

Posted on February 17, 2021 by Gerald Barnett

We are working through the approaches of the IPA master and Bayh-Dole’s standard patent rights clause to the assignment of inventions by nonprofit organizations. Unlike the IPA, which was a federal master contract made with selected organizations, Bayh-Dole is a … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, History | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

The IPA and Bayh-Dole on nonprofit assignment of subject inventions, 2

Posted on February 16, 2021 by Gerald Barnett

We have looked at the IPA assignment clause. Since the IPA is specific to nonprofits, there’s no reason to call out nonprofitedness. But there is a reason then to restrict any later invention assignment to nonprofit assignees. Why? The point … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, History | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

The IPA and Bayh-Dole on nonprofit assignment of subject inventions, 1

Posted on February 15, 2021 by Gerald Barnett

Norman Latker, patent counsel at the NIH, drafted Bayh-Dole on the sly, working against HEW policy on inventions to create an easier pathway by which nonprofits could pass exclusive control of inventions made in work receiving NIH funding to the … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, History | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Turning Point in Federal Patent Policy

Posted on November 28, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

1971. Here’s where things started to go bad. In 1963, President Kennedy issued a memorandum setting forth executive branch patent policy. When the federal government acquired inventions, the policy stipulated that patents would be made available “through dedication or licensing”–that … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, Freedom, History, Policy | Tagged , , , , , | Comments Off on The Turning Point in Federal Patent Policy

Bayh-Dole, Tyrannosaurus

Posted on June 23, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

Bayh-Dole is a mess of a law. There’s the mess of the conception itself, the disgusting and ineffectual idea that the federal government should sue its citizens for using inventions made with public funding to advance public purposes–and should do … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole, Tyrannosaurus

The point at which federal patent policy in 1971 broke from public interest

Posted on June 8, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

Here’s the point at which federal patent policy broke from the public interest. In 1971, President Nixon revised the Kennedy patent policy. One of the revisions was to the federal disposition of inventions. Here’s Kennedy: Government-owned patents shall be made … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, History | Tagged , | Comments Off on The point at which federal patent policy in 1971 broke from public interest

The Purpose of Bayh-Dole: Some History

Posted on May 14, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

Bayh-Dole re-establishes a patent monopoly pipeline from federal funding to the pharmaceutical industry. The NIH first created this patent pipeline in 1968 when Norman Latker, patent counsel at the NIH, restarted the Institutional Patent Agreement program that had been allowed … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on The Purpose of Bayh-Dole: Some History

Bayh-Dole Basics, 8: Reasonable Terms Comments-2

Posted on June 6, 2019 by Gerald Barnett

Now we get to government rights under march in. Here we have complications. In 1968, Norman Latker, NIH’s patent counsel, revived the Institutional Patent Agreement program, under which the NIH (and later the NSF) contracted with nonprofits so that a … Continue reading →

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole Basics, 8: Reasonable Terms Comments-2

Patent agreements in Federal Procurement Regulations and Bayh-Dole, 2

Posted on October 18, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

If we return for a moment to O’Connor’s article–it is a great read for what it aims to do, but for O’Connor’s theme of abstract mistaken assumptions rather than providing a specific account of Latker’s lack of drafting ability–there is … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, History, Policy, Sponsored Research, Stanford v Roche | Tagged , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Patent agreements in Federal Procurement Regulations and Bayh-Dole, 2

Exceptional Circumstances in Bayh-Dole, 5

Posted on August 23, 2018 by Gerald Barnett

Despite the recognition that there are all sorts of federal research programs primarily directed at nonprofit-hosted research that would benefit from a determination that Bayh-Dole’s default provisions do not do a good job of promoting Bayh-Dole’s stated policy and objectives, … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Exceptional Circumstances in Bayh-Dole, 5