We are working through the problems with federal laws permitting federal agencies and nonprofit contractors, in particular to deal in patent monopolies. Although there’s plenty of rhetoric about how patent monopolies are in the public interest, behind it all is an interest in money. When one talks with university administrators about their technology transfer operations, they don’t talk about getting new findings into everyone’s hands, or about helping other organizations develop things. No, they want to know about licensing money. They are not generally interested in making enough money to make licensing a self-supporting service–they want big money, way more than it costs to run a technology transfer office. And they want whatever practices in place that will get them that big money. When a big university donor shows up all critical of technology licensing practices that don’t make big money, they are all ears. And usually those donors’ schemes involve monetizing patent portfolios by more effective exclusive licensing practices. Put another way, practices that move even more toward trying to create a few lucrative deals at the expense of everything else.
If money is the incentive that as a matter of policy should drive such licensing, then one might expect both the licensor institution and its inventors to rally toward the money. And that runs against the idea of public service, does it not? Do nonprofits and federal agencies really need a patent money incentive to fulfill their missions? Do the inventors who choose to work for them need patent money on top of their salaries to try to cure disease? Does that money need to come from patent choke points to engage in monopoly pricing and suppression of anything that might compete or otherwise use any bit of what’s claimed by a patent, even the stuff not used for some commercial venture? Continue reading
