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Author Archives: Gerald Barnett
University monopoly-monopoly IP practices create betting parlors
Examination of a university intellectual property policy apparatus, such as that of the University of Michigan, is instructive. Rarely does one get the chance to do a close reading of such documents outside of a dispute, and if there’s a dispute, … Continue reading
Posted in Technology Transfer
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The University of Michigan Mess of an Old Patent Policy, Part IV
In a series of three articles (here, here, and here), I showed how the University of Michigan intellectual property policy apparatus managed–or didn’t manage–patents and copyrights. One problem is Regents Bylaw 3.10. The Bylaw sets out conditions under which it is … Continue reading
The University of Michigan’s Mess of a Copyright Policy, Part III
Part I of this series looked at the University of Michigan 1944 patent policy and its transmogrified afterlife as Regents Bylaw 3.10, and the strange Supplemental Appointment Information invention present assignment document that claims to derive from Bylaw 3.10. Part … Continue reading
Posted in Bozonet, Freedom, IP, Policy, Present Assignment
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The University of Michigan’s Mess of a Technology Transfer Policy, Part II
In Part I of this series, we looked at the University of Michigan patent policy from 1944, which was still in effect in 1962, its unsettled relationship to the Board of Regents Bylaw 3.10, and a present assignment form last … Continue reading
Five Motivators of University Patent Policy Madness
University patent policies are not what they seem, and are shaped by the exploitation of ideas that have nothing to do with inventiveness, creativity, entrepreneurship, public use, commercial development, investment, economic vitality, public welfare, or even university mission. All these … Continue reading
Posted in Policy, Technology Transfer
Tagged authority, compliance, conflict of interest, liability, money, non-compete, policy, trade secret, university
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The rise of “employee” as a means to pervert university IP policy
We live in a society dominated by the public stock corporation and the manner in which it engages work. It has only been since the late 19th century that the public stock corporation has come to have this role, though … Continue reading
The University of Michigan’s Mess of a Present Assignment, Part I
In reviewing university IP policies, I came upon the following Form HR36100 at the University of Michigan titled “Supplemental Appointment Information.” After a section in which the appointee provides name and social security number, we have this: It is apparent that university … Continue reading
Posted in Agreements, Bayh-Dole, Policy, Present Assignment
Tagged hereby assign, invention, patent policy, University of Michigan
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Four Approaches to University Patent Policies
Policy For the last couple of weeks I have been considering the nature of university patent policies. I have looked at a number of university patent policies and written a number of drafts. Things get complicated quickly, but there appears … Continue reading
Posted in Agreements, Innovation, Policy
Tagged Bayh-Dole, liberty, patent policy, threat
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Do what you have promised to do: Further consequences of (f)(2)
[Updated with a discussion of NIST’s May 2018 rule change] The (f)(2) requirement in the standard patent rights clause authorized by the Bayh-Dole Act is a requirement for the host university to delegate, to flow down, to subcontract a portion … Continue reading
Posted in Bayh-Dole, Innovation, Policy
Tagged (f)(2), Bayh-Dole, disclosure, totalitarian, written agreement
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The First Principle of Bayh-Dole
Here is the First Principle of Bayh-Dole: A federal agency may not require the assignment to the federal government of an invention made with federal support at a nonprofit or small business if an inventor or the inventor’s assignee reports … Continue reading
Posted in Bayh-Dole
Tagged assignment, Bayh-Dole, invention, Stanford v Roche
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