Bayh-Dole is not automagical.
Bayh-Dole does not strip university inventors of their patent rights.
Bayh-Dole does not require or force or assume university ownership of patents.
Bayh-Dole does not make it impossible for university bureaucrats to mess up.
Bayh-Dole does not apply to non-employees.
Bayh-Dole does not require an IP policy.
Bayh-Dole does not care if a university makes money through licensing.
Bayh-Dole does not set as an objective a “return” on government funding in licensing.
Bayh-Dole does not fret about companies using patent rights.
Bayh-Dole does not emphasize commercialization.
Bayh-Dole does not entitle universities to anything.
It is a university choice to take ownership.
It is a university choice to cut inventors out of the decision process.
It is a university choice to interpose an IP policy at variance with Bayh-Dole.
It is a university choice to do things out of order.
It is a university choice to let its personnel consult or collaborate.
It is a university choice to accumulate IP.
It is a university choice to fixate on commercialization.
It is a university choice to be indifferent to IP management.
It is a university choice to try to license for money.
It is a university choice to selectively report licensing activity.
It is a university choice to draw off licensing revenues for inconsequential stuff.
The compelling question is not, what does Bayh-Dole do? but rather why do universities choose to do things this way? Someone quick, do a series of articles and win a Pulitzer. How American universities turned the most inspired piece of legislation in a long while into a bungled bureaucratic pseudo-corporate mess in the hands of patent licensing agents trying to make a buck, train faculty to help them, and spin it all as something glorious for the public.