Tag Archives: Bayh-Dole

Federal agency patent enforcement under Bayh-Dole, 2

Posted on June 7, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

We are working through two assertions about Bayh-Dole. The first is rather easy–Bayh-Dole does not anywhere give federal agencies the right to enforce patents on federally owned inventions. It’s not there. It’s not a matter of much argument. The second … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Federal agency patent enforcement under Bayh-Dole, 2

Federal agency patent enforcement under Bayh-Dole, 1

Posted on June 5, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

This may appear to be an outrageous claim, but it isn’t. Bayh-Dole does not authorize federal agencies to enforce patents held by the federal government. That much is not outrageous because there is nothing in Bayh-Dole that authorizes such enforcement. … Continue reading →

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Federal agency patent enforcement under Bayh-Dole, 1

Bayh-Dole precludes enforcement of federal patents

Posted on June 4, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

An argument regarding enforcement of federally owned inventions. Bluntly: the federal government lacks the authority to enforce patents, and the federal government should not enforce patents, and federal dealing in patent monopolies does not work. Let’s expand the argument to … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole precludes enforcement of federal patents

Can federal agencies enforce patents on federally owned inventions?

Posted on May 29, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

Something outlandish. Bayh-Dole does not authorize federal agencies to enforce patents on federally owned inventions. Go look. I’ll wait. Patents on federally owned inventions are not ordinary patents. Bayh-Dole is part of federal patent law, Chapter 18 0f Title 35. … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Can federal agencies enforce patents on federally owned inventions?

Institutional speculation on public health, 2

Posted on May 24, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

We are working through the problems with federal laws permitting federal agencies and nonprofit contractors, in particular to deal in patent monopolies. Although there’s plenty of rhetoric about how patent monopolies are in the public interest, behind it all is … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Institutional speculation on public health, 2

Institutional speculation on public health, 1

Posted on May 23, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

Folks want to repeal Bayh-Dole–and that would be good–but Bayh-Dole is like a shield and folks still have to get at what motivates corrupt practices under Bayh-Dole. Bayh-Dole does not require corrupt practices–it just creates the conditions that make it … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Institutional speculation on public health, 1

Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 3

Posted on May 22, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

We are working through examples of the claim that Bayh-Dole has led to the creation of 200 new drugs. There’s been a lot of post hoc fallaciphizing–that because Bayh-Dole came before some of these new drugs, they must have come … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, high priced drugs, Technology Transfer | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 3

Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 2

Posted on May 21, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

We are working through claims that Bayh-Dole has produced 200 new drugs where before there was nothing, nothing, nothing at all. In back of it all are three key points: Bayh-Dole means nothing if federal contractors and agencies license non-exclusively. … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, high priced drugs | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 2

Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 1

Posted on May 20, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

The claim of “200 drugs” made after Bayh-Dole came into effect floats around the internet. Here’s an instance from a law firm: The Bayh-Dole Act has been credited with developing over 10,000 start-up companies and at least 200 drugs and … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole | Tagged , , , | Comments Off on Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 1

Why dealing in patent monopolies is bad for university research

Posted on May 19, 2020 by Gerald Barnett

[updated to add some comments among the elements of the list] Bayh-Dole expands the opportunity for universities to deal in patent monopolies on inventions made in federally supported work. Bayh-Dole does not require such behavior, does not give any special … Continue reading →

Posted in Bayh-Dole, Commons, Freedom, Technology Transfer | Tagged , , | Comments Off on Why dealing in patent monopolies is bad for university research