Evaluating university claims of invention ownership

I am working through this idea that an invention is owned by a university merely as the result of work within the scope of employment or through the use of university facilities (and resources and funding and whatever–class 3 unknown).

The logic seems to go thus:

A master is entitled to the fruits of the servant.

An employer is a master, and an employee is a servant.

The university is an employer, and faculty (and others) are employees.

Thus, the university is entitled to faculty (and others’) work.

However, in some cases, it chooses not to take that work and releases it.

As is the case for “traditional academic works”.

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An Exclusive Enjoyment

This case (US v Dubilier Condenser) from 1933 makes an interesting point regarding the idea of a patent as a “monopoly” (citations removed, my bold):

Though often so characterized a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, for it is not created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the grantee of the patent. The term ‘monopoly’ connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working, or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant.   Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge. He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but, upon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use. To this end the law requires such disclosure to be made in the application for patent that others skilled in the art may understand the invention and how to put it to use.

A patent as an “exclusive enjoyment”.  That would make the university claims in faculty inventions a fight over who gets the exclusive enjoyment and would make licensing a form of, er,  sharing the joy.  I haven’t found that in any university IP policies yet.   I guess “ownership” and “public benefit” are more boardroom-like terms for what’s going on.

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All your works are belong to USC

Here’s one for you, from the University of Southern California Intellectual Property Policy.  See if you can figure out what’s wrong untrue with this statement:

Both California and federal law provide that the University owns all intellectual property created or developed by an employee within the scope of his or her employment, including works developed under sponsored research or other agreements and works that make significant use of University funds or facilities. Continue reading

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Present Assignment ADD at UC

The University of California has present assignment language in its “Patent Acknowledgment“:

I acknowledge my obligation to assign, and do hereby assign, inventions and patents that I conceive or develop within the course and scope of my University employment while employed by University or during the course of my utilization of any University research facilities or through any connection with my use of gift, grant, or contract research funds received through the University.

I don’t see that the present assignment was in the PA as late as 2007, when I was still working for UC.  It appears to be a recent insertion.  In the baseline policy, the idea was that employees would disclose their inventions and the university would review them to determine its interest: Continue reading

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Drafting the Unknown

As I’m reading through university IP policies, I’ve begun to notice how those drafting the policies are grappling with the unknown. There are a number of unknowns–many policies don’t evidence that the drafters know IP, and others work hard to reduce the complications of dealing with patent and copyright by conflating the two as “intellectual property” and those who do the work as “creators” or “originators”–anything but authors and inventors. These sorts of things do odd things to policy, by introducing new definitions distinct to the policy, and often with uncertain implications. In other words, by trying to “cover” things, policies may actually create new unknowns that exist only because the policy exists. Policy is itself a social creature, a real character on stage, not one that wears white, or a sash, and therefore is to be considered invisible, or the true relationships among things and people, made visible through the magical authority of policy drafters.

There are a variety of strategies to cover the unknown. The one that comes to mind for me is that of Johannes Scotus Eriugena, who opens his On the Division of Nature by dividing the world into the known and the unknown, and then starting with the unknown. This is so clever that the work was condemned by the Powers That Were, surely something that should endorse the work to us today.  Continue reading

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Fixin' for Some Bayh-Dole Fixing

Here’s more in the wild on vesting interpretations of Stanford v. Roche.  Written by a suit of attorneys at the firm of Bracewell & Guiliani, it gets a piece of the Supreme Court decision right, does a decent job summarizing the case, and finds the gap in the AIPLA work up of the meaning of “of” in an “invention of the contractor” in the definition of “subject invention”.  But then they write this:

It is now up to Congress to patch this loophole by amending the Act to expressly vest title in federally funded inventions in the contracting organizations.

That is, they think that the intention behind Bayh-Dole was to make it a vesting statute, and somehow the Supreme Court made it merely a technical matter that it doesn’t work that way.  Continue reading

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The Party Boat

Here’s a bit from the Rice University Invention and Patent Policy:

In the case of Government-supported research, the Bayh-Dole Act and subsequent amendments and federal regulations provide the basis for current University technology transfer practices. Accordingly, while the University is assigned the rights to intellectual property generated during the course of federally-sponsored research activities, the Government retains the option to claim ownership under certain circumstances. In the event that the Government does not exercise its option (the usual circumstance) and regardless of ownership, the Government retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide license to the invention or to copyrightable material produced under Government sponsorship.

It should be clear that the policy misrepresents Bayh-Dole. Rights to inventions are not assigned to the university by the Act. Continue reading

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MIT's Patent Policy Problem

During the kerfluffle known as Stanford v Roche, one of the big advocates for Bayh-Dole as a vesting statute was MIT.   The MIT amicus brief is here.   It’s in this amicus brief that the idea that a present assignment trumping a promise to assign gets big play.  Perhaps this is the source of the present circulation of the “you must use present assignment language” advice.  The brief gets a lot of things wrong.  Bayh-Dole does not provide a “statutorily prescribed right” to the government for federally supported inventions–rather, it requires agencies to obtain this right as part of the bargain in any funding agreement, unless exceptional circumstances arise, in which case it can get what it needs.  Bayh-Dole does not vest title to inventions in universities, but rather stipulates restrictions to be placed on universities if they do obtain title to federally supported inventions–and those restrictions are greater than on for-profit contractors and on inventors acting independent of their university employers.

The MIT brief argues:

Section 202(d), and indeed the entire Act, are premised on universities and other contractors obtaining title to subject inventions from researchers and others who perform the underlying research.  Otherwise Bayh-Dole makes no sense in giving a university the right to “elect to retain title to any subject invention[,]” id. § 202(a), or, conversely, the right “not [to] elect to retain title to a subject invention in cases subject to” the Act. Id. § 202(d).

You have to appreciate the logic of these two sentences, written as advice to the Supreme Court.  Bayh-Dole has to mean what we says it means, otherwise it makes no sense. Continue reading

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The "Patent Problem" in 1948

I’ve been looking at university patent policies lately and came across this discussion of university patent policies by Archie Palmer from 1948, produced by the National Research Counsel and available through Google Books. The discussion is notable for the clarity with which it lays out the various issues involved in the “patent problem,” as Palmer puts it, something that had been a concern for nearly half a century.

Palmer surveys university patent policies–or the lack thereof–while arguing that it would be progress for universities to have patent policies and not make a virtue out of researcher apathy regarding the practical potential of scientific findings.   He cites debates regarding the advisability of patenting scientific work, and follows with conclusions from various panels and writers that patenting can be beneficial in certain circumstances.

I’m struck with the range of issues that are still with us–the voices advocating for the use of patents to advance industrial development, met by those warning that patents figure to be great disruptors of science and scholarship.  Continue reading

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The CHARM Act of 2012

We’ve had some long posts lately.  It’s been necessary.   And there will be more, to show just how thoroughly technology transfer programs have run amok, how there are viable and attractive alternatives, that there are folks ready to develop these alternatives, and that we need to adapt to changing conditions with a new, fresh, grounded approach to university research enterprise.

Let’s be to the point:

  • University administrators must stop demanding ownership of inventions.
  • University innovation flourished without a compulsory system of ownership.
  • Bayh-Dole does not require a university to claim ownership of inventions.
  • Stanford v. Roche does not require a university to tighten claims to inventions.
  • Academic freedom argues against university claims of ownership of inventions.
  • The natural history of innovation points to networked, non-market practices.
  • Faculty are not hired to invent  for the benefit of their employer.
  • Public science flourishes with open publication and use.
  • Successful technology transfer does not require a university to claim ownership.
  • Compulsory ownership creates unmanageable institutional conflicts of interest.

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