Penn State’s IP Protection Racket, 5: Commercial Potential

We have looked at legacy Penn State IP policy–from 1940 and from 1991. And we have worked through an especially bad piece of drafting in the Penn State IP Agreement, which ignores IP policy, conflates patents and copyrights, garbles Bayh-Dole compliance, and generally evidences the work of amateurs and incompetents. Oh, for any Penn State legal counsel involved–malpractice.

But perhaps things have gotten better. One doesn’t have to stay a newt just because a witch has cursed you into one. Let’s have a look at current Penn State IP policy. We’ll also have a look at Penn State’s guidance on various IP issues, such as federal contracting. WARNING: Not for the faint of heart. Penn State has changed its policy labels, so current IP policy is IP01 “Ownership and Management of Intellectual Property.” There are other IP-related policies as well–adding a separate layer of conflict of interest claims to reign in entrepreneurship–but let’s stick to IP. The complications don’t show sophistication but rather compound the muddle that ends with the proposition that administrators can make anyone at the university do what they say the policy requires. That simple proposition runs behind the muddle, behind the garble of inconsistent and ambiguous drafting, the misrepresentation of Bayh-Dole, the absurd definitions, the fake legal precision.

But let’s work through the formal IP policy anyway, treating it as a document in which words should mean something and not just stand as emblems for bureaucratic control of research discoveries and inventions, for the purpose of making money from patent positions while passing it all off as being in the public interest that such a thing happen. Continue reading

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Penn State’s IP Protection Racket, 4: The 1992 IP Agreement, con’t

Now we can look at Part B of Penn State’s 1992 IP Agreement. Part B concerns extramural contracts and starts with another general statement:

I also understand that, whenever I am associated with activities which are financially supported by contracts and grants of certain Sponsors, the invention and patent provisions of the sponsor agreements and/or applicable institutional patent and copyright agreements may create additional responsibilities with respect to:

In simple words–I agree to comply with any additional responsibilities with regard to inventions and intellectual property set forth in extramural contracts entered into by the University. But here, things aren’t so simple. The general statement refers only to “certain” sponsors–which ones? And refers to “copyright agreements” of the university–what the heck is that, given that this, uh, thing, is the IP Agreement. What’s not stated, and should be, is that whatever these additional responsibilities are, they are required by the sponsor, not by the university. Otherwise, the university can change its policy simply by demanding provisions in an extramural research agreement that are contrary to its policy, and when the sponsor agrees to these provisions, gosh, the IP Agreement turns them into as good as policy, but without the bother of involving the Trustees. Continue reading

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Penn State’s IP Protection Racket, 3: The 1992 IP Agreement, con’t

We are looking at the Penn State IP Agreement in its 1992 form. Part (A) of the agreement sets out what appears on the surface to be a broad scope for inventions (and other stuff) to be assigned to the university, in two areas. The first area, (a), concerns the use of university resources. The second area, (b), is even more iffy and has to do with “field of expertise”:

I especially note the responsibilities set forth below. [no introductory element to the following sentence]

(1) to assign to the University (or its designee) all rights which I have or may acquire in inventions, discoveries, or rights of patent therein which are conceived or first actually reduced-to-practice by me . . .

(b) in the field of expertise and/or within the scope of responsibilities covered by my employment with the University;

Compare with IP policy to see the botch job. In the IP policy, this text pertains to the scope of what must be disclosed, not what must be assigned. But even then, folks can’t get the text the same. Is it that difficult?  Continue reading

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Penn State’s IP Protection Racket, 2: The 1992 IP Agreement, Part A

Penn State manages its IP by means of an IP policy statement and an IP Agreement form. The policy statement made effective in 1991 requires various university personnel (including in the category “academic”–whatever that means) to “complete” an IP Agreement and states that these personnel are obligated to disclose certain inventions to the university, where “inventions” means “inventions and non-inventions.” (Policy HR76 distinguishes “academic employee” from tenure-track faculty and graduate students, so that much at least is clear.)

Let’s look then at Penn State’s 1992 IP Agreement. The IP Agreement is divided into two parts, A and B. Part A covers IP policy requirements. Part B covers sponsored project requirements. First, there is a general preamble:

I understand that my employment with The Pennsylvania State University (hereafter referred to as the University) may be, at least in part, in connection with one or more research, development or other type of project, and which may include contracts or grants between non-University sponsors (hereinafter referred to as Sponsors) and the University.

Let’s clean it up a bit:

I understand that my employment with the university may be in connection with one or more projects, and some projects may involve contracts between the university and sponsors.

What is going on here, besides stating the obvious? Continue reading

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Penn State’s IP Protection Racket, 1: Working Through the 1991 IP Policy

Hey, let’s compare Penn State’s “Intellectual Property Agreement” from 1992 with the present version. I know, just what you were hoping to do today–identify  policy changes to see how Penn State created its IP protection racket. To get there, we’ll have to do some close reading. In formal policy and in binding contracts, words matter, so it’s best that words get used well and get read well. We will start with the 1991 Penn State IP policy. Then we will look at the related IP agreement that came along a few months later, in 1992. Then we will compare changes in both IP policy and the IP Agreement.

Penn State has had for some time an IP policy that states that personnel must sign an IP agreement and disclose certain inventions. The IP agreement, in turn, says that personnel must follow the IP policy in whatever form it happens to be. The basic requirement, then, is that personnel report inventions. But then Penn State administrators slip into the IP agreement whatever else they want to–since policy requires personnel to sign the IP agreement, administrators can–so the theory goes–put whatever requirements there that they want.

Here is Penn State’s patent policy (RA-11) as of 1991 (I use a 1998 version that according to the change history is the same as 1991 but for numbering). It requires individuals in various “classification categories” to “complete” an IP agreement: Continue reading

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Penn State’s 1940 Patent Policy

Penn State University created one of the earliest university patent policies. That policy was revised in 1940. Let’s have a look, and then consider more recent policy statements at Penn State. Like many early university patent policies, Penn State’s policy is remarkably short. The policy distinguishes four situations:

  • Research funded entirely by the university
    (i) with a contract with the employee
    (ii) without a contract with the employee
  • Research funded collaboratively by the university and an external sponsor
  • Research funded entirely by an external sponsor
  • Research done by staff on their own time and with their own resources

Let’s work through these situations.

This first case involves “research workers” who are “engaged for or assigned to specific research projects.” Continue reading

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Bayh-Dole Bombast in Penn State’s 2001 Report on Technology Transfer

In 2001, Eva Pell, Penn State’s Vice President for Research prepared a report for the Trustees on “technology transfer.” In the discussion about why universities should be involved in technology transfer, Pell includes the following account of Bayh-Dole:

Until 1980, the federal government owned about 30,000 patents, many of which had resulted directly from research conducted at universities; and only a small percentage ever became commercialized.

The figure cited was 28,000 patents. But most of these patents arose in defense industry contracting, not university contracting. And there, most of these patents were on inventions that the defense contractors could have owned under federal contracting agreements but chose not to. So this 30,000 figure is inflated. And the “many of which” is simply not true. According to claims made at the time, 5% of these federal patents were licensed for commercial use. However, for biotech inventions, the figure was 23%. For university-managed inventions made with federal support, in the period 1968-78, the rate was about 5%. The government’s licensing rate for biotech inventions was over four times better than the university licensing agents’ rate.

As the for the “only a small percentage ever became commercialized”–this is bombast. First, the overall commercial use rate for patented inventions is about 5%. But Pell’s bombast is designed to mislead the trustees (even if Pell merely repeats stuff that she’s been told is true). The point of the federal patent ownership program was not “commercializing” inventions but rather making them available for public use and benefit. Thus, the focus of executive branch patent policy was in using patents to bring inventions “to the point of practical application” and then releasing the invention for all to use. In some federal programs, such as those at the Department of Agriculture, all inventions reviewed by Harbridge House in 1968 (for two study years) achieved practical application and became commercial products. It is no surprise that many defense, space, and atomic energy inventions did not become commercial products. The “market” for these inventions was the federal government. To “commercialize” these inventions is a meaningless claim. Bombast. Continue reading

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Posting Update

It’s been a busy couple of weeks here. I’m in Santa Cruz for a few days helping with painting the house with my daughter and her husband. I’ve got a new set of articles almost ready to go, but they will have to wait until I’m done here. Meanwhile, there’s plenty of good stuff around. I’ll push some vintage posts to the top of the blog.

If there are topics that you would like to see discussed, send along a note in the comments.

Foggy here, now, but sun in the afternoon. I’m doing the eaves and gutters, so lots more ladder work today.

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Patent Exploitation Alternatives

A patent allows a patent owner to exclude others from practicing the invention claimed by the patent–including any of its variants. A patent owner thus has a limited monopoly on the practice of the invention–making the invention, using the invention, selling the invention (and offering for sale, and importing the invention). By granting the right to exclude others, a patent also therefore allows a patent owner to include others who are permitted to practice the claimed invention.

We might characterize the alternatives this way:

practice the invention (make, use, sell), exclude all others

This is the canonical use of a patent–the inventor practices the invention to his or her advantage, exercising the right to exclude others for a limited time in exchange for publishing the invention.

do not practice the invention, exclude all others

U.S. patent law has no working requirement. A patent owner is not required to use a claimed invention or permit others to use it. The social contract is publication in exchange for a limited monopoly. The public benefit is having an open record of the invention. The inventor’s benefit is having a limited monopoly, however the inventor chooses to make use of that monopoly. Why wouldn’t an inventor work an invention? The inventor may not have the funding or ability. The inventor may have ten inventions and works only some of these inventions. The inventor may use a patent to prevent competitors from making something that they would make but which would compete with something the inventor already makes. There are plenty of advantageous reasons not to work a patent. Continue reading

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Key Concept 5: Public Covenant (Addendum)

The Need for a Public Covenant

A public covenant attached to a patent property right reflects a determination that the federal patent system, on its own, is not adequate to a given governmental or private purpose. We might say, a public covenant reflects the judgment that the patent system is not perfect, at least not for all purposes. For instance, U.S. patent law does not have a working requirement–a patent owner can exclude all use of a patented invention for the life of the patent. Yet, if a governmental purpose is to support research for the purpose of making the results of that research available for public use, then private patents may be used to frustrate that purpose. Why should the federal government fund research to advance the science available to the public, only to have nonprofit organizations obtaining patents on these advances and refusing to license rights to anyone? A public covenant ensures that a patent will be used consistent with the objectives of the funding that supported the inventive activity.

The Kennedy patent policy stipulated that patents might be used by contractors to exclude others for three years only–in that time, the contractor must use or develop the invention for its own advantage. After that, the contractor must make the invention available to others by licensing. In the Kennedy public covenant, a contractor’s incentive was to develop a patented invention and then profit by using the developed invention before making it broadly available. The Harbridge House report in 1968 pointed out that, for experienced contractors, over 80% of federally supported inventions they claimed were in use by the time a patent issued; that is, within three years of the invention. By contrast, for contractors without commercial experience, fewer than 60% of inventions were in use by the time a patent issued. Similarly, experienced contractors licensed 10% of their inventions resulting in use by others, while inexperienced contractors (such as nonprofits) licensed only 5% of their inventions resulting in use by others. Continue reading

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