A Little Lecture on Bayh-Dole

If you look at the list of purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act at 35 USC 200, you will find these elements:

Use the patent system to

promote the utilization of federally supported inventions

encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research and development

promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofits

ensure that inventions are used to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research

promote commercialization and public availability of inventions made in US with US labor

ensure Government gets sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet its needs and protect public against nonuse and unreasonable use

minimize the costs of administrating policies in this area

I count 10 (boldfaced) purposes, and “commercialization” is only one of these, and only then balanced with “public availability” and qualified by US manufacture. Continue reading

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Invention and Expertise

University IP policy tends to implement a “great man of invention” assumption. This is easy to do, not necessarily intentional, and unforgivable for a research organization of any sophistication.

The “great man of invention” model proposes that a dominant individual (of any gender) invents in some degree of isolation (standing apart from, if not above, ordinary folks with their “ordinary skill in the art”) through dint of genius (or inspiration, or effort, or enlightened luck) and conceives of an invention in sufficiently complete detail that private investment (the inventor’s own, or others’) is motivated to develop, manufacture, and sell the thing. Unfortunately, this does appear to happen. In variations of the model, the inventor stands in (a kind of metonymy or part for the whole) for the team, and serves as its face and its designated beneficiary.

There are all sorts of problems with this conception of inventors and inventions in a research environment. Research is often collective, not isolated. Invention is not necessarily an important research result and certainly doesn’t cede control of research direction or collaborative relationships to any “inventor” as a result. University research in particular is nearly always aligned with and funded by one or more patrons or sponsors. There is always some form of interested party. The inspiration to invent in such circumstances may come about as much by being among others with more than ordinary skill in the art than by rising above them. Finally, the inventive elements of research assets often have social rather than economic claims on them, tied to integrity of reporting and group decision-making rather than the simplistic chains of corporate employment or the simplistic lack of chains for the independent inventor. The great man of invention model is keen to establish itself, and proves tremendously useful–and potentially damaging–to anyone who makes the mistake of adopting it. Continue reading

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Software and Biotech Licensing

University technology transfer is dominated by the what can be called “biotech licensing” expectations. University administrators and licensing professionals tend to believe that “biotech” is where the money is, both now and historically, and that the primary means of getting at that money is to have a foundational patent on a biotech invention that can be licensed for a running royalty on sales. This is the “big hit” and the technology transfer literature is stocked with them.

The general expectation of a biotech big hit is that it requires an exclusive patent license to support a few hundred million dollars of private investment that will separate one compound out of perhaps 10,000, and run through perhaps 10 years of tests and regulatory benchmarks, to create a product that can be sold in a market for up to 20 years as a return on the initial investment. The biotech license requires big markets and players with plenty of capital to pull this off. The biotech license is that perfect tie between a social benefit (freedom from disease, or at least making an acute condition chronic) and a big cash upside. It’s almost magical.

My own sense of it is that big-hit innovation runs in speculative windows that last a few years to perhaps fifteen. For biotech, that window was from about 1980 to the mid 90s. For internet, mid 90s to about 2002. Speculation can look like a “bubble” or it can look like “expansion” or it can look like “re-engineering”. Universities largely missed the internet window because they were still busy trying to do biotech deals, even though that window appears to have been closed for a decade and half.

Whatever the driver, in a speculative window, there is a whole lot of interest in getting into early stage technology to preserve a piece of action for downstream efforts. Hence, plenty of licensing deals. A lot of university biotech deals were done “in the window,” before fundamental science was normalized, infrastructure built, and value chains organized. Soon those deals will be winding down. There continue to be university biotech licensing deals, but they appear to lack the frequency and upside of the deals “in the window.”

If one wants to ask broader questions here, they might be: is speculation a better driver than collaboration? is crossing the “funding gap” the critical issue for the success of a patent license anticipating product development? is the best licensing strategy to pick a primary model and stay with it until conditions come around again? will the biotech expectation eventually “work” in energy, environmental technology, regenerative medicine, bioengineering, nanotechnology, and synthetic biology? if everyone “sticks to the plan,” will industry eventually have to take a biotech-style license?

It is these sorts of questions that underlie the critique of university licensing practices with regard to information technology. In the IT industry, university licensing is seen largely as a barrier to innovation. This drives university technology transfer folks nuts. How can universities be standing in the way of innovation by trying to license early-stage inventions to industry and getting stonewalled? To the patent hammerer, anything that’s not a nail looks like a biting insect.

To get at some of these questions–which I have not seen raised in this way (certainly no references to biting insects)–let’s look at some differences between practice in biotech licensing and software licensing, at least for assets arising from university research. There are lots of pitfalls in working with a broad brush, but some advantages too. Here is a list of differences:

1. Network Effects. Software licensing exploits network effects, while biotech licensing tends to avoid these, or at least postpone them until a licensee is in hand. Network effects include critical mass–getting enough adoption to form a community; congestion–having too many requests or demands for a plan or system to work well; channel formation–repeat transactions or business that becomes reliable; strength of weak ties–referral opportunities from folks at a distance from your personal knowledge; and externalities–shared value created by your initiative that arises across a communities’ use, such as readily available folks who know how to help you.

2. Product Indifferent. Software licensing does not depend on a product stage, while biotech focuses on this. Software licensing may focus instead on building a community, or a platform of shared bits of code, all of which may be locally adapted and used to good effect, in conducting research or internal operations, without any product being created. Many biotech applications simply cannot be used generally without moving through extensive testing, regulatory screening, and packaging to reach a state acceptable for use in or with people. Software and data sets may take a stable form that is not a product, but rather something more like a community shared asset, more like a church service or company picnic.

3. Multiple IP. Software licensing typically relies on multiple forms of intellectual property, whereas biotech is often focused on utility patents. Where patents arise in software licensing, they often are involved implicitly, as in Apache v.2 licensing. In biotech, one would be working against best practices to bury a patent right in a collaboration, “throwing it in” in favor of a near-term working relationship. Yet software in biotech sponsored research agreements is frequently treated just this way. The research agreement will require a negotiation for an exclusive royalty-bearing license, but will throw in all software and copyrights royalty-free, regardless of their relationship to inventions subject to the option. For software, there typically are multiple copyrights, and may as well be trademarks in names and logos attached to the software and to services that may run alongside software, such as for assistance in installing, configuring, or versioning the software.

4. Non-Exclusive. Software licensing assumes choice is key to early adoption, rather than exclusive, dominant control points. While software licensing may focus on integrity of a named code base (“if you change it, call it something else”), it often assumes that the user community will provide changes, feedback, and applications–all of which help to develop the software and secure its position in the context of other technology. Software licensing–especially but not only open source strategies–permit cross licensing and standards development in ways that biotech licensing rarely considers. Biotech licensing still has not come to accept engineering approaches to technology. In biotech, the exclusive rights holder sets the agenda and works to defend this agenda against all comers. There will be more openness in biotech licensing when clinical trials must test a new compound in the context of 30 others that also might be present, not just against a control. At that point, the exclusive clinical trial will have to be rethought, with a whole lot more access to compounds, design engineering, modeling, and sharing of data prior to testing in humans.

5. Nothing, nothing, nothing–nothing at all. Software licensing does not have to happen at all. That is, people will take up and use interesting code (or not), regardless of the licensing regime. Open source licensing does not add much over no licensing protocols at all. What people want is a clean pedigree–that the software, say, hasn’t been stolen–and that folks are up front on its faults as well as its functions. Companies may want to have some documentation that confirms software is properly available. But in doing so, it becomes clear that in a university licensing deal, it is the recipient that wants a contract, not the university. In software licensing, if a company pays, it is because it wants to pay. In biotech licensing, the assumption is that companies do not want to pay, and it is the job of the licensing offer to make them pay. In some odd way, this is akin to waiters believing that they make diners pay for their meals and their tips, as if diners had not made the choice to pay in entering the restaurant and ordering a meal. Companies choose to work with universities over software. Any company that wants to avoid university claims on software can readily do so, with just a little bother. The essence of software licensing is that the university offers something that companies really want to support–a neutral development site, scientific validation, a steady stream of trained graduate students who know how to use the code, a set of improvements reflecting shared interests of a research or user community, an unpackaged non-product code base that can be locally versioned.

These differences point to a more important set of differences between software and biotech. More about that later.

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Posting Management

I have spent the last couple of months exploring other forms of discussion, including Linked-In discussion groups, Google groups, Twitter, Kyte, Wikis, Facebook, Plaxo, Spoke, conventional listserv discussions, and plain old email. My sense is that Linked-In discussions for the most part spin down with only a few comments in a thread. Facebook is more personal but isn’t particular suited to discussion. Twitter marks stuff that’s interesting, but is more like a head’s up service.

Perhaps it’s difficult for folks to see a post and reply, as they would with email, since they have to click on a link and perhaps sign in before they can make a comment. The posting and revising resources also aren’t all that great. For instance, the edit function of the Linked-In discussion is much too limited–one can’t edit for style or show changes (after 15 minutes), as one can with a blog post or a wiki. One also can’t see the number of views, can’t link into existing comments, or adjust relevance (such as with collaborative filters). It’s also hard to supply a deep link to a discussion in these forums, as they are rather captive groups–you have to be a member first with some of them.

The most robust comments activity seems to be in the comments sections after news articles and in review areas in places like Amazon and Newegg, which are sort of out of the way for research enterprise stuff–though having some great book reviews all in one place would be worthwhile! There we also find some of the most inane stuff, but it is useful to recognize what we are, collectively.

Perhaps it’s not necessary or even desirable for there to be a bunch of comments on any given posting. But in terms of social media, it may be worth considering how we interact with this stuff, what good it does (if any).

Meanwhile, I’m aiming to bring back some of my work from elsewhere and redevelop it here, so it tracks all in one place. Downstream, I’ll try to do a better job of developing ideas here, and cross posting versions as it seems worthwhile. Thanks for following this thread of ideas.

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Open Innovation and University Tech Transfer

Open innovation lies at the root of university technology transfer. The fundamental expectation in moving technology from basic research to industry requires that companies accept incoming technology. As soon as one is up against the “not invented here” syndrome, one is dealing with open innovation issues. The challenge for university technology transfer is that in its biotech-centric dominant model, one typically wants the “open” bit to happen only long enough for a company to become a commercialization partner. The rest of the license contract is often written to ensure that the company treats the licensed IP as if “closed”–that is, the license will pay attention to diligence to create a product and market for product, and to sublicensing to ensure stuff is not just given away or cross licensed or dedicated to a standard without “fair compensation”. That is, university technology transfer patent licensing *relies* on open models, but its general practices then *discourage* it when it comes to licensee exploitation of rights. A glimmer of hope lies in the way in which start up deals are structured around equity rather than royalties. Here’s hoping for a time when there are exits!

Open innovation is way more than a theory. In fact, if there is a limitation to Henry Chesbrough’s work at this point, it is that there’s such an overwhelming body of available information, it’s really, really difficult to assemble it and create a decent theory that accommodates the full range of what is happening. It’s a real transformation going on, and it has been at least since IBM unbundled software from its mainframes in 1969. Open source, the internet, open documents, creative commons, and the public side of the human genome project are all instances–really huge big hairy instances. We now need folks in the scholarly community to spend a lot more time working the directions Henry Chesbrough is pointing out and a lot less time counting patents and licenses and income clustered around a biotech model that has been mostly business as usual since the mid 90s.

Open innovation can be seen in the internet–which is a whole truckfull of university-generated technologies that have become mission critical infrastructure–not just software and standards, but also the hardware and firmware. Open source software is but a subset of this activity. It extends into emerging standards for new media such as open document standards. That Adobe Reader works because there’s an open standard people can use. Computer and other information technology hardware works the same way. There is a huge activity within the industry in cross-licensing and standards development. It’s often very political, with a lot riding on outcomes, and it is in the standards development that a lot of market position is won or lost. Creative Commons makes open processes operational across a host of media assets. Science Commons aims to extend these approaches into the realm of collaborative research. The activity is already there–Science Commons can play a pivotal role in developing ways to make exchanges routine across copyright and patent rights, against various jurisdictional controls (such as those on information, like HIPAA for health sciences).

We can see open innovation at work in the human genome project and the bioinformatics industry that is springing up around it. The effort is reflected in the NIH Guidelines on access to tools, in the way in which disease assays are managed within the lab medicine community, in new organizations like the Biobricks Foundation for “open wetware” and in the deposit requirements for data and materials in support of publications in biomedical areas. This isn’t theory–this is on the ground practice tied to insights into how research is conducted and the norms of access, interoperability, and ability to modify that are essential to advancing research goals.

Open models build infrastructure, and infrastructure in turn creates market opportunities. It may be that in university technology transfer fixation on using patent rights to pop company lids open for just long enough to insert a product-development control point, they are missing what is going on all around them. The transformations in energy and transportation and communications that we are looking at now are fundamentally infrastructure transformations. The universities that play in these arenas will learn to be really, really smart about how they contribute to infrastructure. Your environmental technology invention to clean oil from beach sand is not going to be licensed exclusively to some start up who will sue the City of Santa Barbara for infringement if some oil rig off shore springs a leak. You will have to reserve a whole lot more rights than you are doing now in your routine biotech patent licenses. That 9th point to consider will really matter–and the moment you reserve more than non-profit research use, you are deep into open innovation venture mechanics. Before there will be product licensing opportunities in these areas, universities will have to support infrastructure development.

What doesn’t work for university technology transfer offices is their apparent reticence to unfixate for even moments on seeking royalty-bearing patent licenses to produce product. Open innovation here doesn’t work (other than for that tupperware moment to burp the company IP lid) because university technology transfer is a lagging edge activity. Tech transfer offices hold onto a narrow model of the technology world that has generated a handful of “hits” over 25 years and for the most part squandered a ton of opportunities to put university work into play much more modestly (from the point of income) and much more valuably (from the point of relationship building, contribution to infrastructure, and even capture of value). When was the last time your tech transfer office dedicated patents to a standard? Agreed to a no-cost cross license? Licensed a pool of patents for no charge in order to create a market for other inventions to come? When was the last time your annual report billed your work as a “rainmaking” activity, creating huge benefit for others rather than just for your own institution and licensing program? Yeah, I know. This goes to 11. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d54UU-fPIsY

The good news is that open innovation is a way to address that artifact of marketing patents for product called the funding gap, creates a wide range of intangible assets that are even sweeter and juicier than the typical patent license (which we all know covers patenting costs and then dies, or at least goes into a cocoon to emerge as a wickedly beautiful asset play). The tough love news is that university tech transfer offices will have to build out additional capabilities and infrastructure to handle open innovation in emerging areas of science and technology. It just ain’t going to happen like it’s 1983 all over again. The new windows of speculative investment learn from what has gone down already. Don’t expect the same deals to resurface. We don’t have the same IPO market, and we have new venture and angel players, and we are looking at whole new industries that have to consider their competitive environments. As von Hippel points out, we’ll have to figure out where the points of innovation uptake are going to be in these new (for university tech transfer) value chains, and hit these with our best efforts–which to start may be to create tools, testbeds, and standards. Much of what we need now from universities will never hit a product stage but will be crucial to build the competitive infrastructures of the future.

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Economic Development and TTX

Paul Wellings, Vice Chancellor at Lancaster University, apparently has come out with the idea that government policy should make clear that “the primary purpose of research commercialization is to benefit the economy as a whole, rather than create an income stream for universities.” This was posted on the Linked-In discussion group Licensing Managers. I’ve reposted my reply here.

This is the kind of gesture (“benefit the economy as a whole”) that has great rhetorical merit and provides virtually no operating guidance. Why benefit just a state economy and not look out after a global economy? Why deny local stewards of new findings some standing in how work proceeds, especially given that new technology developments are unlikely to be pre-packaged commodity “ideas” that can be traded around by bureaucrats or the general public like cars and carrots. New high tech insights are often deeply social–the tacit knowledge, the intuition of what can be done next, the possible alternative explanations, the new data that can’t be explained so easily.

A much better policy might be: “we support with funding and acknowledgment those stewards of new research findings–whether individuals, universities, foundations, or companies, whether working together or competitively–that mobilize resources to promote transformation of research findings and artifacts to useful applications.” At this level, ownership doesn’t matter. Licensing revenue doesn’t matter. Warm, fuzzy communal sharing doesn’t matter. What does is encouraging top talent to go on task to do something difficult and uncertain. If getting the next grant is always easier, more certain, and carries more status than the hard work to shape a finding into a form others can understand and use, then “innovation” will always be “someone else’s problem”. If that’s the goal, then, sure, add as much bureaucratic red tape as you can to the researchers and universities working to identify and shape findings for uptake, then blame them for not being so good at it.
The UK

The defect in public policy isn’t in the IP–it’s in how governments in particular support technology-based change relative to the status quo. That’s essentially what research innovation represents–not research findings or IP, but the transformation that intends to displace existing practices–and livelihoods–with new ones. It’s a most difficult thing, obviously, because governments have so much invested in riding whatever keeps them in power. Certainly universities don’t keep them in power, and individual researchers don’t–so it’s attractive to punt everything to “the public” or to “government” or to “industry leaders”. The real debate is over who gets to drive changes to the technology status quo, and in what directions? Given universities are so confused and indifferent and underfunded for this role, perhaps they are better suited than those filled with a passionate intensity for it.

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Layers Confusion

Folks confuse research and administrative layers in making research arrangements.

Research is about the conduct of inquiry. It carries certain conventions. Folks don’t generally sign contracts to work together, publish together–it’s a complex household, where there are commitments and shared resources, but no one is renting the refrigerators to the others. More to the point, it takes the form of a commons–remarkably stable, competitive and collaborative, mixing and matching, surging and sagging. If one wanted to pin it more broadly, the assets take the form of traditional knowledge. The administrative layer, by contrast, is about statutes, regulation, compliance, formality, contracts, clearly defined transactions.

The mistake comes when administrative folks try to handle academic or research commitments in a contract.

First, they mostly can’t do it. This is tough, nuanced drafting, and it’s just outside of most people’s skill to do it. How does one articulate that a company visitor may have access to in-progress degree research, that the degree research is not a trade secret, but the company can’t use or disclose it without the permission of the student doing the research, his or her dissertation adviser, the project he or she is embedded in, and perhaps also the approval of others external to the university involved in the project? So there’s non-disclosure, but there’s not. It’s impossible to draft it well, so folks overshoot, and force a broader NDA on the situation, which then appears to be a restriction on open research, and that sets off a whole cascade of contractual countermeasures.

Second, when administrators do articulate a set of academic expectations via a contract, they usually have succeeded in reducing the mix and match of research opportunity and direction to a single pathway, which they want to do for clarity in a contract, but which also creates overhead for a research program, so usually folks ignore all but the most coarse things, like appointment of a technical point of contact.

In other words, by placing an otherwise stable scholarly practice in a contract, even if they get it right, they restrict transactions to this single approach and put more overhead on the research–which they then also have to manage, or “train” the researchers to manage.

Third, so they get it nuanced and right, and they enforce it on the project and the sponsor–they still don’t have behavior, just a paper representation, so in essence what they have done is greatly increase the apparent risk of breach, the liability for it, added countermeasures in the contract to counteract problems, raised the degree of uncertainty calling for accountability remedies, and added a new administrative cost in “training”, compliance, auditing, and the like.

It makes no sense to aim to improve the pace at which negotiations in the administrative layer of research contracting go forward if the subject matter is inappropriate and the structure of the relationship itself is malformed. Pushing for faster negotiation of contracts that intrude into the research space does nothing to improve university-industry relationships, produce more high performing research, or do a better job making research assets available.

The practice point is: keep academic and research layer things out of contracts, which are in the administrative layer.

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Confidentiality Agreements

There’s a topic header for this over at the University & Industry Innovation Forum. I’ve put a summary there. Here, I’ll post a fuller discussion. As with other areas of discussion on industry-university arrangements, confidentiality triggers cascades of reasoning. This alone–that there is a cascade rather than a clear decision both sides can see–means that interactions will tumble along to a surprise rather than make for an efficient exchange.

Confidentiality agreements present tremendous challenges for universities. Universities generally operate open laboratories and conduct open research, drawing on students, volunteers, and faculty from various parts of campus, including foreign nationals. Only in isolated circumstances do universities implement the control systems necessary to handle confidential information in research. For instance, a university may operate a laboratory for the Department of Energy or Department of Defense subject to security classification requirements. Typically, such a laboratory is in its own building, does not permit students in its classified research, and faculty are permitted only by request. Universities may justify such work as being an important contribution to national security. Most company research will not benefit from similar arguments.

In addition to lacking, by choice, control systems for research information, universities generally do not contract to preclude publication or to require it. Publication is an academic, not administrative, choice. Since university contracts are administrative in nature, it is the general case that a research contract will not be an appropriate instrument to handle publication matters. Even trying to restate in administrative terms the nature of academic freedom is bound to create problems. Similarly, universities generally do not permit faculty or students to enter into private agreements on university matters (such as university-managed research) or to represent the university in administrative matters such as contracts. Thus, it is not generally an option to seek private side agreements with university personnel with regard to university research unless permitted by the university, as otherwise it would appear that the company is interfering in the employment and contracting relationships of the university.

Export control regulations apply when technical information is restricted, either in being supplied to a university research environment, or when the research itself is subject to publication restrictions. Universities have worked hard to maintain exceptions from export control laws, such as exceptions for fundamental research, library deposit, and classroom instruction. “Deemed export” requirements are of particular concern, as these apply to information transactions in the United States where the receiving party is a foreign national who is not a permanent resident, a US national who is an agent of a foreign government, or is an employee of a company not registered to do business in the United States. Complying with these regulations represents a huge problem for universities. The problem arises not merely because of the lack of controls for confidential information, but because to implement such controls, a university would not only have to close its laboratories and research, but also would have to create a multi-tiered system under which foreign nationals would not have access to various laboratories or research unless they first cleared export control licensing requirements imposed by the federal government. Universities are not willing to give up the positions they have preserved over the years, nor to undertake the expense of implementing a control system, nor to transform their open research culture, simply to have a sponsored research relationship with a company.

The typical confidentiality agreement restricts disclosure of confidential information and places controls on its use. A stand alone agreement may identify the nature of the information to be exchanged, limit the extent to which such information is subject to confidentiality requirements, provide a protocol for exchange, set standards for reasonable controls, and offer a set of remedies and risk language pertaining to breaches of the agreement. In the context of sponsored research agreements the confidentiality clause is often perfunctory, sometimes stating nothing more than each party will not disclose any confidential information received from the other party. While general and apparently simple, such clauses represent substantial compliance problems for universities, if information is ever provided in reliance on them. Since such clauses rarely provide specifics on what information is provided that is subject to confidentiality, the university has little chance of identifying the information as administrative assets, even if it wanted to implement a control environment for confidential information. With regard to export controls, unless the company provides the ECCNs associated with the information and whether the information is U.S. or foreign origin, a university will have a difficult time identifying the information controls and implementing a screening process. It is even worse if the research agreement elsewhere aims to make compliance with export control laws a university obligation, since the decision to provide confidential information is otherwise strictly a supply-side matter. For these reasons, a university is more than justified in resisting general confidentiality agreements related to its research.

Company representatives often fail to appreciate that a university environment is not a command and control situation. At times, university faculty forget this as well. The university is a governance structure, not a control structure. Administrators adjudicate competing interests; they do not order faculty and students about, supervise their work, and re-assign and fire folks at will. A university does not badge its employees, it does not restrict access to its research labs, it does not contract to prevent its researchers from publishing or from discussing their research. A company seeking to provide technical information under confidentiality has to be careful to set up the transaction so that a university may continue to operate open laboratories and research, publish in a usual manner, and not trigger export control requirements. There are ways to do this, but folks have to pay attention to detail. A typical industry-grade confidentiality agreement will not do it. It makes little sense to say “that’s the university’s red tape again, standing in the way of innovation, corporate collaboration, and international competitiveness”–that’s just not the issue. That an industry contracting officer has got caught up in administrative wrangling on this matter indicates a fundamental problem with understanding the nature of the relationship.

A starting point is for companies simply not to provide confidential technical information to a university for research purposes. This may be a total bother but it comes with being involved in university research and it cannot be changed by trying to negotiate “better terms” in a research agreement. Even if one were to get a change of language sneaked through, all one has done is made the agreement at greater risk for breach, since a university generally will be unable to comply. The cascade of contractual apparatus that recognizes this—upping the ante for remedies, holding the university accountable for breach—only serve to make it clear that the obligations and threats associated with taking the company’s funds far outweigh any possible public benefit for getting involved.

There are ways to provide information to a university research project without disclosing a company’s trade secrets. For instance, a parallel research problem may be set up, so that an answer in an open model environment provides the company with the information it needs to make a corresponding change in its proprietary environment. Thus, the company can provide hypothetical data rather than specific proprietary data. The company can also break apart a complex problem into parts, so that no one university has full access to the complete—and proprietary—picture. While these approaches take additional work, doing so eliminates the need for a confidentiality agreement.

If there still exists a need to provide controlled information, the company should reduce the information to written form and rely on copyrights, review, and collaboration protocols for control rather than a confidentiality agreement. Copyright includes the right to exclude public display, the making of copies, and distribution of a work in copies. Copyright does not prevent access or disclosure, but does go a long way to limit any public release. If information is so sensitive that such controls are not adequate, it is also probable that the information is not suited to enter a university research environment in the first place. In addition to copyright, a company can request a time limited (typically 14 to 60 days) pre-publication review of scholarship in the form of articles, conference presentations, or poster sessions. These reviews should be restricted only to patentable subject matter and inadvertent use of company-controlled copyright works (not “information”). A review does not prevent private disclosure of information within the lab, but it does provide a check on public access to company materials.

The general rule is: use copyright to provide information, and use patent to manage results.

Attempting to force all private disclosure to a prior review or approval point once again suggests that the company does not comprehend the nature of an open research environment. Graduate students are going to talk. Faculty and visitors are going to talk. People should want this to happen. It is one of the great strengths of university research. It is one of the distinctive things most companies cannot do for themselves, because of their proprietary positions on information assets and law on competition. The effect of a demand for total review is the sequestration of a university lab from most interaction with other labs, which runs against the strength of research in most university settings, and against the administrative capacity to provide compliance infrastructure. Again, extra control requirements increase the probability of a breach; they do not change behaviors.

Finally, as an alternative, a company can introduce a collaborative element. This has other overhead, but with regard to managing information it means that company personnel are participants in the research and can reasonably expect to co-author any publications that may result. As scholarly co-authors, the company personnel have the opportunity to review manuscripts and request the deletion of company proprietary materials, without requiring the university to manage this as a compliance step in a contract. As such, a collaboration element, whether indicated expressly by a research contract or not, allows the company to engage an academic control—co-authorship—rather than an administrative one—confidentiality clause in a research contract. The practice aim is not to require as an administrative condition that the company be a co-author of all scholarly works, but rather to create the collaborative environment in which shoulder-to-shoulder lab work can take place.

Beyond these controls, there are ways to manage non-disclosure to mitigate. One is to limit the kind of disclosure rather than placing an absolute prohibition on disclosure. This approach aims to prevent private disclosure of designated technical information, while allowing disclosure as part of making the results of research available to the public. The message is: “we’re providing this information to you, and if it turns out to matter for publishing results, then you may do so, but we’re not handing this to you so you can broadcast it to the world merely because you got it from us.” Doing so allows university researchers to publish in the normal course of their scholarship the information they may receive, while restricting direct re-disclosure of company-supplied information independent of scholarly publication. That is, the confidentiality agreement requires that supplied information only be published and not made available through private transactions other than those with a need to know who accept the conditions of the industry sponsored research. This approach still may challenge university compliance infrastructure but will allow the university to remain within the fundamental research exception to export control regulations, as the research is not restricted with regard to publication of results, even if those results include company-supplied information not otherwise generally available. This approach also may help researchers meet deposit requirements for data and tools associated with claims made in scholarly publications.

If confidential information simply must be provided as part of the research, universities generally place a great deal of importance on whether the confidential information is essential to the research or ancillary. For instance, providing the details of a company project–internal budget, staffing decisions, time frames, potential products– may be important for framing up a research protocol, but may have little to do with the reporting of results. Proprietary information may, however, be fundamental to the research, and limitations on the disclosure of the information are also then limitations on the publication of results. Universities hate that outcome. Nothing good happens. The university sees it as a trade on research integrity–if results are favorable to a company’s interests, then they get published; if not, then the confidentiality clause kicks in and nothing comes out–which in effect *is* a kind of publication, and *isn’t* what universities contract to do. If a company wishes a university lab to test a prototype product, for instance, the results of the research may necessarily reveal otherwise non-public specifications of the product. While such testing—including beta testing of software—may be perfectly well formed in restricting publication, it should be pretty clear how a university contracting office will see the confidentiality restriction as limiting publication. A useful drafting technique then is to identify the confidential information, state that it is not intended that the information be fundamental to the reporting of research results, and that if the information does prove to be bound up in the reporting of results, then to the extent that research reports do not also copy company documents without permission, and to the extent the company has a limited right of prior review, the investigators will not be prevented in publishing the information in the normal course of their reporting research results. Otherwise, take the testing outside of the university research environment. Some universities set up centers to support testing–sometimes in conjunction with access to sophisticated equipment, sometimes to give students service learning experiences, and sometimes to provide faculty with a “clinical” or “extension” setting in which to practice their professional skills. These centers may take the form of a professional services plan, an affiliated non-profit company, or an internal structure (like a cost center) in which policy has been adjusted to handle industry needs (especially for standard transactions, fee for service). A company might see if such a setting is available before trying to negotiate confidentiality terms for a generalized research agreement. Location and purpose matter.

To handle confidential conditions, effective practice includes using stand-alone agreements outside the research relationship, limiting the extent of confidentiality, describing a protocol for provision of information, and limiting remedies in the case of a breach or other dispute. A stand-alone agreement allows information to be identified at the time it is needed, to develop specific handling instructions, and to allow research to proceed under a separate contract while any particulars pertaining to confidential elements are worked out. Doing things this way makes it clear that the information is not essential to the research, and the research relationship itself is not being held as leverage on specific clauses such as confidentiality—which again sends the message that confidentiality is in fact more important than the research, raising doubts whether the university should be participating in such research at all. A working protocol may include having the receipt of confidential information subject to the discretion of the university’s principal investigator, directing that all such information be received by the principal investigator from the company’s primary technical contact—to prevent confidential information from moving informally from other company personnel to, say, graduate students or others at the university who may not, in the judgment of the principal investigator have a need to know. That is, if there is to be a compliance matter with regard to confidential information, it should be a matter for a principal investigator to decide first, and then for the university administratively to concur with the investigator’s request. If either is a “no” then the information can’t come in. Other elements for a protocol include reducing confidential information to written form, allowing “residuals” from the exposure to the confidential information, and limiting the term of confidentiality to no more than one to three years.

If the information is so valuable that the company would be moved to sue for damages, then the research should be done some other way, such as bringing university personnel into the company as consultants or while on leave from the university. A theme of this discussion has been to change the manner by which information is provided rather than raising the stakes with regard to accountability for an otherwise untenable requirement. In keeping with this theme, a company can reduce the apparent liability for the university by limiting remedies to injunctive relief for disclosure in violation of the confidentiality agreement and termination of any research contracts that may be affected by an unauthorized release of information or use of company works protected by copyright. At least then the threat of liability does not implode administrative interest in completing the negotiation. Company folks forget this, thinking that if the threat is huge, then the compliance will follow. But if there’s nothing valuable in the research contract for the university–starting with serving broad public missions–then it was only a courtesy that the university considered the industry sponsored research in the first place. From the university perspective, upping the threat for non-compliance is more in the way of insult and disregard than a barter over terms. There’s a huge compliance engine in universities already–when companies learn to rely on it–and provide it with the resources it needs to do its job–then the need for forcing remedies into research contracts diminishes. One does not have to contract for what is already there and practiced, or if one does, it is at the risk that it defeats its own purpose–isolates the lab, raises the overhead, forces stuff into a special bin, and generally throws off the whole enterprise. Why would a university do this for some small bit of action? If a company, or better, a group of companies, can make a case for a multi-million dollar center, that the public will be served by its outputs, that participation in its efforts are voluntary, and that it will provide the funding to manage the administration of compliance for things like confidential information, then there’s a good chance a university, or a group of universities, will see the point in setting up custom services responsive to the purpose. Scale matters, along with location and purpose. This is a big problem with university administrators using statements of “principles” to guide their forays into the unknown. Principles would appear to operate regardless of scale, or they aren’t really principles are they. Just convenient assertions, or temporarily stable whims. The very notion that university research contracting should be driven by principles doesn’t make sense. Where’s the principle in that? This is something that takes some sophistication to set aside. One way is to invoke “diversity” of values as enriching a university, moving then to the research context, and from there saying, let’s focus on the collaboration that will benefit students, faculty, the public, and the sponsor, and from there let’s look at what principles support what we’ve agreed to do.” There are other ways, but it isn’t so good to ask an administrator to “violate” the principles they have set up. Generally, principles in a university policy setting are there to provide leverage for saying “no” and not for mobilizing resources. Principles statements are patches on bad behaviors, bad experiences, and bad outcomes. Folks wanting to get past the principles are assumed to be in favor of more of that badness, even when their aims are altogether beneficent.

In general, universities are set up to promote open scholarship. Confidentiality agreements are not merely a matter of paper negotiation, but often require special facilities and infrastructure to be in place. Universities generally are not able to set up such special resources to support any particular sponsored research agreement. No amount of negotiation pressure will change this. At best, a university may choose to accept greater liability—which fails to reflect a real company interest in information security, makes the relationship with the company appear more as a liability than a benefit, and makes the research appear to be primarily a matter of private interest rather than public benefit. All of this suggests that such an arrangement, even if accepted once, will not serve as a precedent, and may in fact work against repeat relationships with the company sponsor.

To summarize: Rather than using confidentiality, a company should consider relying on copyrights for provision of information and patents for managing research results. If confidentiality is still necessary, then the company should restrict information to business information, not technical information; and if technical information, prefer information that is not essential to the reporting of research results. If the information truly is essential to the reporting of research results, then engage university personnel another way (such as through personal consulting or a center set up to handle the arrangements), or be willing to permit publication of the information in the normal course of scholarship, even if not permitted through disclosures that merely would report the information itself and not as part of reporting research results. Avoid trying to impose accountability standards that would raise the financial exposure (via penalties or defensive litigation costs) of administrating the arrangement, separate the confidentiality contract from research contracts generally, and select information for which inadvertent release is not so consequential that the loss of trade secrets represents irreparable harm or significant economic loss to the company. If a company has no confidence in the diligence of the principal investigator to handle its information with reasonable care, there is no point in raising the issue by adding penalty clauses in a research agreement or confidentiality agreement.

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Other RTEI feeds

I am experimenting with other forms of interaction to engage folks in research enterprise topics. There’s a Twitter feed, not sure how valuable it may be, that tracks a bit of what I’m doing each day. Right now the feed is from “Umbut” which has a story about it, but, um, not now.

On Linked-In, we’ve got a new group up called New Research Enterprise, which might be a useful way of assembling articles on the development of innovation policy, how university research in particular (but also federal lab, foundation, and industry research) play into it, and what can be done to extend, improve, correct, and stimulate practice and policy. Even if we are “doing just fine” as some would have it, the commitment to community must include a constant edge to figure out how to do things way better. RTEI is one of those edges. This discussion may help to identify professionals that want to build out new research-community interfaces, especially ones that take advantage of open business models.

As well, we’ve got the Yahoo IM chat tool up at RTEIUW. I’m hoping that small school IP and research contracting programs might find it useful as a point of discussion as they navigate various opportunities.

Also aiming to get IAN up and going. The stub from 2007 is still a good start–it just took a lot longer to get RTEI up as the platform than I thought. See http://ian.terapad.com As RTEI scales up our operations, we’ll be putting some resources behind IAN to create a referral of opportunity network and a set of tools to rapidly build commons to expedite uptake of research assets.

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RTEI IM

[RTEI IM is now a Twitter feed. Follow @umbut]

An experiment. If you are working in a research environment that is facing a challenge, RTEI is available to offer general assistance. One way to get in touch is to use an Instant Messaging interface. I’ve got one set up via Yahoo IM. It’s pretty easy to install Yahoo IM, and you can use other IM agents, such as Meebo or Trillian, if you have a preference.

Though IM has a reputation as a text-abbreviated chat window, it also can be used for work interactions. It has the advantage of immediacy, like a phone call, without the full on effort of keeping a phone conversation going–there can be pauses in the exchange. IM text tends to be shorter than emails, and doesn’t have to be saved at all–it is a transitory communication forum that allows text exchange to work like oral communications. You can turn it off or on, so it doesn’t have to interfere with the rest of your work day–it’s like being able to turn off your phone, or have it only ring through the folks that matter in the moment–wow–what a concept.

If you have questions from time to time about policy, general strategies, templates for research or licensing, or how to handle various kinds of issues that arise in managing technology or IP, or managing a technology transfer or sponsored projects office, then you might try out RTEI IM. You can be invisible to everyone on the net, so no one has to know you are there. You can quit whenever you like. It’s not a big deal. Especially if you are at a small office and would like to extend your access to expertise, this may be a good, low overhead way to go at it. Unlike a listserv or discussion group, you don’t have to broadcast your questions to the world. It can be a one-on-one exchange.

RTEI is especially interested in helping folks sort out new practices (even if just new to them) and develop innovative responses to opportunities to innovate and entrepreneurp.

To get started, create a Yahoo IM (or other agent) account (if you don’t have one). It can be web based, or you can download software to your workstation and run it from there. Yahoo IM Messenger 9 is available at this link:

http://messenger.yahoo.com/

Once you have chosen a user name and a password, you can create a link to RTEI’s IM account by requesting RTEI UW as a contact. To do this, from the main Messenger window, select the Contacts menu, and the “Add Contact” item. In the box, type “RTEI UW” and the “Next” button. This will send a message to RTEI and when we’ve confirmed it, we will be linked up as IM contacts.

To send an IM, click on RTEI UW in your contacts list, and type stuff in the box at the bottom. The size of each message is limited, so keep stuff short. You can send files through IM as well as text, so there are ways to move around larger chunks of text if necessary. IM also provides a back up in case your email server goes down (this happens!). As long as you still have internet access, your IM agent will stay up and working.

I usually start an IM with a “ping”– a short query–“Hi” or “Have a moment?” And end with something that makes it clear that the long pause to follow is not just an interruption but I’m moving on–I tend to use “cu” for “see you”. “bye” or “thanks” or “gotta run” work as well.

If you have questions about IM, you can send email to barnett (at) rtei.org

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