Author Archives: Gerald Barnett

Institutional speculation on public health, 2

We are working through the problems with federal laws permitting federal agencies and nonprofit contractors, in particular to deal in patent monopolies. Although there’s plenty of rhetoric about how patent monopolies are in the public interest, behind it all is … Continue reading

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Institutional speculation on public health, 1

Folks want to repeal Bayh-Dole–and that would be good–but Bayh-Dole is like a shield and folks still have to get at what motivates corrupt practices under Bayh-Dole. Bayh-Dole does not require corrupt practices–it just creates the conditions that make it … Continue reading

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Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 3

We are working through examples of the claim that Bayh-Dole has led to the creation of 200 new drugs. There’s been a lot of post hoc fallaciphizing–that because Bayh-Dole came before some of these new drugs, they must have come … Continue reading

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Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 2

We are working through claims that Bayh-Dole has produced 200 new drugs where before there was nothing, nothing, nothing at all. In back of it all are three key points: Bayh-Dole means nothing if federal contractors and agencies license non-exclusively. … Continue reading

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Bayh-Dole on 200 drugs, 1

The claim of “200 drugs” made after Bayh-Dole came into effect floats around the internet. Here’s an instance from a law firm: The Bayh-Dole Act has been credited with developing over 10,000 start-up companies and at least 200 drugs and … Continue reading

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Why dealing in patent monopolies is bad for university research

[updated to add some comments among the elements of the list] Bayh-Dole recovers and expands the opportunity for universities to deal in patent monopolies on inventions made in federally supported work. Bayh-Dole does not require such behavior, does not give … Continue reading

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What Bayh-Dole Does–enabling but not requiring exploitation of patent monopolies

Prior to the NIH Institutional Patent Agreement program, the Kennedy executive branch patent policy required federal agencies to do the following: Allow contractors with real businesses in non-governmental markets to own inventions made under federal contract, except in research directed … Continue reading

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Open: The proper (and effective) role for public institutions in invention management

There are many things we could do, but choose not to do. Some of those things, people could make money doing, but we refuse. We could sell body parts, or eat them, or we could make people slaves–good money in … Continue reading

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The Purpose of Bayh-Dole: Some History

Bayh-Dole re-establishes a patent monopoly pipeline from federal funding to the pharmaceutical industry. The NIH first created this patent pipeline in 1968 when Norman Latker, patent counsel at the NIH, restarted the Institutional Patent Agreement program that had been allowed … Continue reading

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The Purpose of Bayh-Dole: Effects

Bayh-Dole re-establishes a pipeline of patent monopolies on federally supported inventions in public health running from federal agencies to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. This patent pipeline operates directly from federal agencies granting exclusive licenses (35 USC 207-209) and through nonprofit … Continue reading

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